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Abstract: 
While focusing on the protection of distressed sovereigns, the current debate intended to 
reform the International Financial Architecture has hardly addressed the protection of 
creditors rights that varies among laws. I suspect however that this constitutes an essential 
determinant of the success of suggested solutions, especially under the contractual approach. 
Based on a sample of bonds issued by developing countries states in the period, January 1987 
to December 1997, I find that, for given contract characteristics (e.g. listing markets and 
currency), the governing law is selected according to its ability to enforce repayment. 
However, although the New York law seems looser and incur larger enforcement costs than 
the England&Wales law, the former permits equivalent yearly credit amounts. I interpret this 
as a consequence of the existence of a larger set of valuable assets (e.g. trade) in the US that 
constitute implicit securities. My findings yield important implications for the reforms. In 
particular, provided that there exists a seemingly equivalent enforcement credibility between 
England and New York laws, the prompt implementation of the contractual approach solution 
should constitute a valuable first step toward efficient sovereign debt markets. 
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“Exploring ways to improve the sovereign debt restructuring process is a key part of the 
international community’s efforts to strengthen the architecture of the global financial system.” 
Anne O. Krueger, First Deputy Managing Director of the International Monetary Fund. 
 
1  Introduction 
The recent and spectacular financial distresses of sovereign states of large emerging 
economies, e.g. Mexico (1995), East Asia (1997), Russia (1998) and Argentina (2002) have 
raised growing concerns regarding the economic inefficiency of the current international legal 
frames of sovereign debts. The debate that emerged, have been reconsidering the international 
financial architecture and the implementation of reforms that would help improve financial 
distress workouts of sovereign debtors. If there is a general agreement on supporting 
collective action among lenders similarly to English & Welsh law that requires a majority of 
debt holders (usually 75%) to modify repayment terms, opinions still diverge regarding its 
implementation. 
The  contractual approach  suggests that the so-called  collective action clause (CAC) 
would either become a standard covenant included in bond contracts (e.g. Yianni (1999), 
Eichengreen and Mody (2000b), Buchheit and Gulati (2002), Kletzer (2002)) or be introduced 
through amendments in major governing laws. In either of the two forms, the financial 
community supports this solution.
1 The statutory approach suggests instead the creation of an 
official Sovereign Debt Restructuring Mechanism (SDRM). An independent supervisory 
agency would be established, the International Monetary Fund (IMF) being a suitable 
candidate through the modification of its statutes. This solution is strongly supported by Anne 
O. Kruger, IMF first deputy managing director (Krueger (2002); see also Bolton and Jeanne 
(2002)). A key difference between these approaches resides in the way decisions will be 
taken. While clauses bind holders only within the same bond issue, the SDRM would allow   2
for different bond instruments to be aggregated  into one single vote on the proposed 
restructuring, as in commercial debt restructuring (see e.g. White (2002) for a valuable 
discussion of the two approaches). 
I believe that the outcome of each of these propositions depends to a large extent on the 
variation in the protection of the rights of creditors among the various laws. Indeed, 
maintaining unbalanced creditor rights protection is likely to result in hazardous 
restructurings. For instance, holders of debts governed by strong creditors rights protection 
may block any restructuring because the value of their collateral is implicitly larger. As a 
consequence, the distressed sovereign will offer larger compensations than it would necessary 
be otherwise in order to prevent an official default due to a minority of creditors. In this case, 
the contractual  collective-action clause  (so-called, CAC) would be insufficient and might 
become in some cases counter-productive. Hence, I believe the thorough understanding of 
creditor rights under each law is essential. Nevertheless, in its attempt to provide enhanced 
protections to sovereign debtors, the current debate has dismissed this point. This paper 
suggests bridging the gap. 
What actually happens today is that  ad-hoc national laws govern sovereign debt 
contracts. The so-called governing law constitutes the only legal frame for every individual 
debt contract. Although the immunity of foreign states remains the general rule, major 
governing laws are inclined to breach the doctrine of sovereignty and adopt the restrictive 
doctrine of foreign state immunity. Provisions mainly apply to commercial activities which 
states carry out abroad. Unlike corporate debts, the governing laws of sovereign debts have 
strong implications on the restructuring and the enforcement of the terms of the contract 
(Wood (1995)). Beyond that, the governing laws are conflicting if not competing, which is 
                                                                                                                                                                                                           
1 See for instance the intervention of Joseph Ackerman, Spokesman and Chairman of the Group Executive 
Committee, Deutsche Bank, in Financial Times, September 26, 2002   3
not the case for firms, which may opt to submit to the jurisdiction they like (Ayotte and 
Skeele (2002)). 
I find evidence that the governing law is indeed selected in order to favour the lenders’ 
ability to take legal action against the sovereign defaulter. Hence, the relevance of the 
governing law seems to be a prerequisite to gain access to international capital markets. The 
second result is that the credibility and the enforcement costs associated with each law will 
have an impact on the size of the debts (yearly and relative to GNP). The two major 
governing laws, namely England and New York do not present substantial differences though. 
Therefore, I believe the contractual approach should not suffer from unbalanced bargaining 
power among lenders. It would indeed constitute a first major step in the sense of the 
improvement of the economic efficiency of international financial architecture. 
The results are consistent with previous evidence suggesting that the asset value and 
contracted amounts are larger under laws that provide stronger creditors rights and 
enforcement (e.g. La Porta et al. (1999), Fabbri and Padula (2001)).
2 The results are also 
consistent with the hypothesis that the presence of threats of commercial penalty motivates 
the presence of sovereign debts (Bulow and Rogof (1989), Rose (2002)). 
The rest of the paper is organised as follows. Section 2 makes a comparative analysis of 
national laws and jurisprudence, with a comprehensive survey of the US and English&Welsh 
codes. Section 3 draws the consequences for the choice of the governing law and its 
determinants. Section 4 then presents the sample of sovereign public issues and descriptive 
elements of the governing laws. Section 5 presents the results and the robustness tests. In the 
last section I summarise the results and provide concluding remarks. 
                                                                 
2 See Euromoney October 2002 Vol. 33, no. 402, p.66-69, “Nigeria rewrites the rule book” by Felix Salmon.   4
2  National laws: ad-hoc international legal frames for sovereign debts 
First and foremost, I shall specify that the following analysis applies to foreign states. 
National states should be viewed most often as immune agents in their own jurisdictions. This 
said, it is the general rule that states benefit of legal immunity in foreign countries. Among the 
commonly adopted governing laws, I know none of them that has not adopted the doctrine of 
foreign state immunity. Nevertheless, jurisprudence and, more recently, codes have 
implemented exceptions for which the sovereign immunity should not apply. This is known as 
the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. There are three major issues associated with the 
determination of the deimmunisation of foreign states entering into commercial activities, and 
more specifically loan transactions. First, the definition of foreign states varies. Second, the 
judicial court must determine the “commercial activity” feature of the transaction. Third, the 
jurisdiction should be relevant ( forum conveniens). These three elements constitute the 
guidelines to the following comparative analysis. 
2.a. The adoption of the restrictive doctrine of sovereign immunity in national jurisdictions. 
Table 1 presents a non-exhaustive list of countries that adopted the restrictive doctrine of 
foreign states immunity. The judicial decisions apply to commercial activities which are not 
necessarily credit facilities. Interestingly, English origin laws only (origin law classification 
follows La Porta et al. (1997)) have codified the restrictions on sovereign immunities. The 
new acts were  adopted in the United States (1976), United Kingdom (1978), Singapore 
(1979), South Africa (1981), Pakistan (1981), Canada (1982), and Australia (1985). The 
codification contrasts with the jurisprudence exercised in other countries, in particular 
Continental Europe. 
The family of French origin laws have mixed implementation of foreign states immunity. 
If Belgium and Italy are considered as the forerunners in the adoption of the restrictive 
doctrine of sovereign immunity, France is actually lagging. In Belgium and Italy, judicial   5
decisions of deimmunisation are essentially related to building contracts and farming loans. 
Instead, France has historically adopted a narrow version of the restrictive doctrine despite 
recent changes. Generally speaking, the situation in France remains broadly unclear unlike in 
Belgium and Italy, although it seems that the commercial approach would prevail. The 
jurisprudence therefore tends to deimmunise foreign states which enter into  commercial 
transactions. 
Among German origin laws, Switzerland has had a long tradition of the narrowest view 
of the doctrine of foreign state immunity. The Swiss court takes however action only if there 
is a substantial connection (Binnenbeziehung) between the activity and the Swiss jurisdiction. 
For example, jurisprudence predicts that a connection is acknowledged where payment of the 
bonds is required by the contract to be made in Switzerland (Dreyfus case, 1918). The 
restrictive view of the forum conveniens will prevent the Swiss law from being a major 
governing law of sovereign debts. Still, provided the strong and traditional commitment of 
Swiss courts in the waiving of foreign state immunities, Helvetian law constitutes a precious 
means of enforcement available to the creditor. Germany is also little specific despite the 
precedence of international over national laws. Conversely, Japan has adopted the absolute 
immunity rule. However jurisprudence is scarce and includes only one case.
3 
Of English origin laws, UK and US legislations deserve most attention. The motivation is 
twofold. On the one hand, the codification allows a clearer reading of the exceptions on 
sovereign immunity. Second, both England and New York laws are well known for being the 
major governing laws of sovereign debt contracts. Nevertheless, despite their similar view of 
the restrictive doctrine, the two acts diverge on essential definitions. They also diverge in their 
specificity. The next section is intended to highlight these differences through a comparative 
analysis. 
                                                                 
3 Matsuyama & Sano v. Republic of China (1928), 7 Dai-han Minroku 1128.   6
2.b. The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act 1976 (FSIA) 
The US Foreign Sovereign Immunities Act (FSIA, thereafter) of 1976 came into force in 
January 1977 and is retroactive to outstanding contracts signed earlier. The act on sovereign 
states immunity is first aimed to adopt the  restrictive  doctrine of sovereign immunity. 
Although foreign states immunity is codified, exceptions are set down. 
Foreign State. The act defines foreign state in the following manner: 
§ 1603. Definitions[…] 
(a) A “foreign state” […] includes a political subdivision of a foreign state or an agency or instrumentality 
of a foreign state as defined in subsection (b).  
(b) An "agency or instrumentality of a foreign state" means any entity -  
(1) which is a separate legal person, corporate or otherwise, and  
(2) which is an organ of a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, or a majority of whose shares or 
other ownership interest is owned by a foreign state or political subdivision thereof, […] 
 
Any entity involved by this definition of foreign state thus benefits of sovereign 
immunity unless restrictions apply. This is actually a rather broad definition of a foreign state 
that covers most of public firms. 
Commercial activity. In the FSIA, there is ambiguity in the definition of the commercial 
activity itself which constitutes the core paragraph of the act since it determines the exception 
for which the state is not immune. A commercial activity must be carried on in the US by a 
foreign state. This is defined as follows: 
(d) A "commercial activity" means either a regular course or commercial conduct or a particular 
commercial transaction or act. The commercial character of an activity shall be determined by reference to 
the nature of the course of conduct or particular transaction or act, rather than by reference to its purpose. 
(e) A "commercial activity carried on in the United States by a foreign state" means commercial activity 
carried on by such state and having substantial contact with the United States. 
 
Hence commercial activity means either a regular course of commercial conduct or a 
particular commercial transaction or act. The commercial character is determined by the 
nature of the conduct or act, and  not its purpose. It is however unclear whether a loan 
contracted by a state should be deemed as a commercial transaction.   7
A contact presumably includes negotiation and signature of financial contracts involving 
US creditors or merely repayable in the US. It is questionable whether the term contact also 
involves any dollar denominated lending. Interestingly, although interpretations generally 
involve financial contracts that enter the exception clauses, attempts to amend the code in a 
specification purpose, especially the amendment proposed by Senator Mathias in 1984 (which 
followed the UK Sovereign Immunity Act 1978, more specific on this matter) was rejected. 
The statement was the following: 
any promise to pay made by a foreign state, any debt security issued by a foreign state, and any guarantee 
by a foreign state of a promise to pay made by another party
4 
The act has been amended in 1988 though, introducing the following statement:
5 
28 U.S.C. § 1605(A) 
(6)in which the action is brought, either to enforce an agreement made by the foreign state with or for the 
benefit of a private party to submit to arbitration all or any differences which have arisen or which may 
arise between the parties with respect to a defined legal relationship, whether contractual or not, concerning 
a subject matter capable of settlement by arbitration under the laws of the United States, or to confirm an 
award made pursuant to such an agreement to arbitrate, if (A) the arbitration takes place or is intended to 
take place in the United States, (B) the agreement or award is or may be governed by a treaty or other 
international agreement in force for the United States calling for the recognition and enforcement of arbitral 
awards, (C) the underlying claim, save for the agreement to arbitrate, could have been brought in a United 
States court under this section or section 1 607, or (D) paragraph (1) of this subsection is otherwise 
applicable. 
Therefore, ambiguities regarding the financial contracts have been left out by the 
legislator. The Allied case jurisprudence actually predicts that the loss of time consecutive to 
the ambiguity of the FSIA give time for politics to reflect on the case. Indeed, the argument 
for dismissal of the Act of State doctrine was denied by the government only several years 
later and concluded the debate (Leigh (1984) and Greenwood and Mercer (1995)).In 1992, the 
decision of the United States Supreme Court regarding the case Republic of Argentina v. 
Weltover, Inc
6 has removed the ambiguity as to the commercial nature of the public debt of 
foreign states. 
                                                                 
4 in Atkeson and Ramsey (1985) cited by Delaume (1994). 
5 An additional amendment was enacted in 1996 against terrorism. Despite its political importance, it is of little 
relevance in this study. 
6 112 S.Ct. 2160. US Supreme Court, June 12, 1992; 31 ILM 1220 (1992). Summarised in Pizzurro (1992)   8
In approaching the issue of whether the defendants’ acts were sovereign of commercial, the Court noted 
that, while the FSIA contained a definition of “commercial activity”, it left the critical term “commercial” 
largely undefined. […] The Court held “that when a foreign government acts […] in the manner of a 
private player within [the market], the foreign sovereign’s actions are ‘commercial’ within the meaning of 
the FSIA.
7 
2.c. The UK State Immunity Act 1978 (SIA) 
English & Welsh law introduced the State Immunity Act (SIA, thereafter) in 1978 taking 
effect the same year with no retroactive effect on contracts signed by the date of enactment. 
Similar to the US FSIA 76, the UK SIA 78 adopted the restrictive doctrine of the sovereign 
immunity and was aimed at giving guidelines in international commercial disputes. The Act 
also enabled the United Kingdom to ratify the European Convention on the State Immunity of 
1972. 
Foreign State. The act states the sovereign immunity of the state unless a few exceptions 
apply. A state is defined as any foreign or commonwealth state. Under the English Act the 
political subdivisions that benefit of the sovereign immunity is limited to the state, the 
government of this state, and any department of this government. Separate entities benefit of 
immunity to a lesser degree which should be compared to “any agency or instrumentality of a 
foreign state.” 
Commercial activity. The UK act removes all doubts regarding the commercial feature of 
the borrowing activity: 
Section 3(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings relating to-- 
(a) a commercial transaction entered into by the State […] 
Section 3(3) In this section "commercial transaction" means-- 
(b) any loan or other transaction for the provision of finance and any guarantee or indemnity in respect 
of any such transaction or of any other financial obligation 
Loan transactions are explicitly included in the definition of the “commercial activity” for 
which foreign states benefit from no immunity. 
                                                                 
7 Pizzuro (1992)   9
Jurisdiction.  Unlike the United States courts, the mention of the English law as the 
governing law in the commercial transaction is sufficient for the English courts to create 
jurisdiction: 
Exceptions from [jurisdiction] immunity 
Section 2(1) A State is not immune as respects proceedings in respect of which it has submitted to the 
jurisdiction of the courts of the United Kingdom. 
 
The English courts “ could nevertheless claim jurisdiction if, inter alia, the loan 
agreement is expressly or impliedly governed by the English Law: they could then apply the 
UK Act.” (Wood (1995) p. 142, section 14-47, Jurisdiction). Hence, the inclusion of the 
English law as the contract’s governing law is a sufficient condition for the UK Act to 
become applicable and creating jurisdiction in England. 
Comparative summary 
Foreign state. The definition in the UK act is narrower and is set to include only state and 
government entities. The US act instead covers firms in which the foreign state holds a 
majority of shares or of votes. 
Commercial activity. Both acts constrain sovereign immunities and deny the latter in 
commercial transactions entered into by the foreign state. However, if the UK code explicitly 
states loans as being a commercial activity, the US act remains ambiguous. The latter also 
specify that the commercial transaction should have direct impact on the USA. Although the 
New York jurisprudence have assimilated some loans as being a commercial activity having 
an impact on the USA, the interpretation of the impact varies from the currency determination 
(US Dollars) to the country where arbitrage takes place. 
Jurisdiction. The US act provides clearer insights on these regards since the statement 
that a federal law governs the transaction is sufficient to create jurisdiction in the respective 
federal state. Although the UK act is less specific, there are good reasons to believe that the 
Act applies after the courts create jurisdiction.   10 
The UK act is therefore more specific and gives rise to almost no ambiguities: if a state 
enters into a loan transaction governed by England law, it automatically submits to English 
courts which according to the State Immunity Act 1978 will remove its immunity. On the 
other hand, the inaccurate US FSIA 1976 exposes the creditor who attempts to sue the 
sovereign defaulter to higher risks of failure. Delaume (1994) also showed the judicial cases 
were time-consuming in the USA. As a consequence, the England law should be regarded as a 
governing law that incurs substantially lower enforcement costs and less uncertain judicial 
decisions. 
3  The selection of the governing law of sovereign debts 
The comparative law analysis presented in the previous section yields several 
implications. First, the enforcement of the terms of a sovereign loan contract is apparently 
contingent on various features of the contract itself with respect to the governing law, e.g. 
“direct impact”, “substantial connection”. On top of that, the specificity of the act is likely to 
affect the decision to make a repayment claim in courts. I remind that the US FSIA 1976 is 
little precise relatively to the UK SIA 1978 making judicial decisions relatively uncertain and 
suing costly. Conversely, the England & Wales code precisely regards all loans entered into 
by a foreign state as a commercial transaction and raises no ambiguities regarding the 
immunity waiving. Judicial inefficiency has been acknowledged to having high economic 
costs in credit markets, especially on the availability of credits (Jappelli et al. (2002)). The 
UK act or any law put in the efficient context is therefore likely to increase the availability of 
funds. However, the US FSIA 1976 is likely to decrease the common pool problem if 
compared with the UK act. Part of the answer to the question whether the governing law 
matters or not is related to the following two questions. First, is the design of the governing 
law determined by its probability of enforcing repayment? Second, does the enforcement 
credibility have a positive impact on foreign credits availability?   11 
3.a. Is the governing law designed according to its enforcement power? 
The analysis of the design of the governing law of sovereign international bonds will 
provide first evidence of whether the governing law functions as an enforcement device in 
sovereign debt markets. Following the survey provided here above, I suggest a combined 
survey of the governing law, the currency of denomination, and the countries where the 
liability is traded. Indeed, on the one hand, the law of the country where it is traded does not 
necessarily govern the bond. On the other hand, it may actually be traded in more than one 
market. As I showed in section 2, currency denomination and listing are the main factors of 
the probability of the law enforcement effectiveness. 
The results should be interpreted in the following manner. The application of England 
law is not contingent on neither the place of listing nor the currency of denomination. Instead, 
New York law needs a direct impact on the US. Therefore most of debts that are governed by 
US law are either in US dollars or traded in the US. The same result applies to Swiss law, 
which requires substantial linkage with Switzerland. On the other hand, Japan law has no 
restrictive elements of foreign states immunity and therefore it will not be designed, should 
the governing law matter. 
Broadly speaking, the context in which governing laws are selected predicts their 
importance in international as well as in domestic markets. The analysis is however 
insufficient. I will complete the analysis by exploring whether the amounts raised under 
different governing laws are significantly different. 
3.b. Does jurisdiction shopping
8 allow for larger foreign credits availability? 
Assuming that the enforcement credibility of the governing law is real, the sovereign 
agent will raise more or less under the diverse governing laws. Indeed, following the 
                                                                 
8 The expression “Venue Shopping” stems from Ayotte and Skeel (2002).   12 
hypothesis that the low enforcement power of the contract terms has a credit rationing effect, I 
expect the weak laws to allow for lower amounts. To investigate this hypothesis, I suggest the 
following statistical model: 
i,j,ki,j,k
1i,j,k2i,j,k3i,j,k
4i,j,ki,j,k
Yearly amounts to GNPconstant
+ .Germany + .Japan + .New York
+ .Debt to GNP + Errors
aaa
a
=
  (1) 
where subscripts i, j, k, respectively indicate ith country, jth year, and kth governing law. 
Yearly amounts to GNP are yearly amounts of bond debts issued by a given country and 
governed by a given law relative to the given country’s GNP. The ratio provides relative 
amounts of debts in a given governing law. Germany, Japan, and New York are dummy 
variables that indicate whether the group of bonds is issued respectively under German, 
Japanese and New York laws. Note that, provided that all other laws govern a marginal 
amount of Euro-bonds, the analysis applies only to bonds that are issued under England, 
Germany, Japan and New York laws. Moreover, the benchmark law is England and is not 
included in the equation. Because of enforcement constraints, I expect Germany and Japan to 
allow for lower amounts and therefore a1 and a2 to be negative. On the other hand, New York 
is supposedly more costly, although recent jurisprudence has shown that for a well-designed 
debt (having a “direct impact” on the United States), enforcement power is likely to be alike. 
On the other hand, submitting to New York courts will allow the attachment
9 of a larger set of 
assets since the United States attract a large share of the world economic activity. The 
prediction of results is therefore uncertain. 
The Debt to GNP variable is calculated as the total outstanding debts of public entities in 
the issuing country relative to the country GNP. All macroeconomic variables are obtained 
from the World Bank databank Global Development Finance. The ratio is aimed to include a 
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debt indicator in the model. I expect that the debt to GNP ratio has a positive impact on the 
amounts issued under each governing laws. 
4  Data sampling and description 
The data is collected from various issues of the  International Financing Review. I 
selected all bonds issued or guaranteed by sovereign states (pure sovereign) in the period 
January 1987 – December 1997. For specific reasons, public administrations and entities 
(quasi sovereign) and public firms were dismissed. January 1987 is the starting date from 
which the governing law is reported. The set of countries is constituted of all countries 
defined as Less Developed Countries by the World Bank in 1998, where more severe threats 
of default exist. The definition is based on per-capita income. The upper bound was then set 
to 9,655 thousands US dollars. 
Tables II and III present the summary statistics of the sample. It is constituted of 329 
bonds issued by pure sovereign agents in the period between January 1987 and December 
1997. Of the 329 observations, 327 report the governing law making a loss of 0.6 percent 
only.
10 Altogether, the 327 bonds are issued by 32 different sovereign states. Of the 327 
observations reporting the governing law, 322 report the listing market and all report the 
currency of denomination. 
Only eight national laws govern the 327 public debt contracts. England law governs the 
largest number of them (117), while New York comes second (85). Altogether, New York and 
England govern 62% of the loans in the sample. Germany (66) and Japan (49) are also highly 
represented with 35.2% of the sample. There are four additional governing laws, namely 
Austria (two observations), Luxembourg (one observations), Spain (two observations), and 
                                                                 
10 Two observations do not report the governing law. One of them was a bond issued by the Republic of Turkey 
(04 October 1991, presumably a private placement), the other one by the Republic of Latvia (private placement, 
03 August 1995).   14 
Switzerland (five observations). However these governing can be viewed as marginal laws 
with a trivial 3.1% share. These results are identical to Eichengreen and Mody (2000b). 
Surprisingly, in constant dollars volumes, New York law governs the largest share of 
public debts.
11 The next section reports the results regarding the analysis of the credit 
availability by governing law. 
5  Results 
5.a. Is the governing law designed so to enhance the enforcement power? 
Table IV presents a group analysis of the governing laws and the related listing markets 
and currencies of denomination. In particular, I look at the number of sovereign bonds 
denominated in the currency of the governing law and/or listed in the jurisdiction of the 
governing law. As detailed in section 2, it matters for the forum conveniens and the eligibility 
of bond for sovereignty restrictions. I also look at the Rule of Law rating provided by la Porta 
et al. (1997) for national law enforcement (see Table 1). 
Interestingly, all selected laws have a very high rating of the Rule of Law. England is the 
lowest with 8.57. Most of other laws display a 10.0 rating. However, the main result of the 
combined analysis of governing laws, currencies, and listing markets is that issuers set 
governing laws of their tradable liabilities in accordance to their enforcement power given the 
listing markets and the currency. Among non-private placement bonds, New York law govern 
67 non-private placement international bonds of which 59 are either denominated in US 
dollars or listed in New York. Only 8 are neither of them. 
Besides, all bonds governed by Japanese law are listed i n Tokyo, and vice-versa. All 
loans are denominated in Japanese Yen. The same applies to the German law: all 65 German 
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consumers provided online by the US Bureau of Labor Statistics.   15 
law governed bonds are denominated in Deutsch Mark and traded in Germany. Last, England 
law governs all types of bonds whether they are listed in England or not (87 observations of 
98 are not listed in England), and whether disbursements are made in UK Pounds or not (92 
observations are not denominated in English pounds). A vast majority of the England law 
bonds are listed abroad and denominated in a foreign currency (84 out of 98, that is 86%). 
Note that marginal governing laws (namely Austria, Luxembourg, Spain and 
Switzerland) are associated either with the currency or the country of the listing market. 
Interestingly, Luxembourg is the place of listing of a majority of tradable debts but the 
Luxembourg law governs seven contracts only. This is consistent with practitioners’ analysis 
(e.g. Yianni (1999) and Rhodes (2001)). 
Therefore, I find evidence that the governing law is not randomly designed. Instead, all 
bond loans governed by a given law are either denominated in the currency of the jurisdiction 
of the governing law or listed in this country. This provides evidence that the legal framework 
to some extent helps enforce contract terms of repayment. 
5.b. Jurisdiction shopping and foreign credits availability 
The second part of the investigation concerns the amounts raised by the countries under 
the different governing laws. Independently of the size of the country, the amounts raised 
under different laws should matter if the credit-rationing hypothesis holds. The sample 
includes 322 bonds issued between January 1987 and December 1997. Descriptive results are 
presented in Table VII. 
I find average individual amounts relative to GNP are lower in German and Japan laws 
(0.24% of GNP), while New York law allows raising larger amounts on average at every issue 
(0.85%). England is in between at 0.57%. The debt creditworthiness indicator hardly is a 
factor of choice of governing law. Namely, more indebted countries would not issue under   16 
any specific law. For any governing law, the average ratio of outstanding debts to GNP of 
issuing countries  is close to 40%. Therefore,  laws do not catch  specific  types of debtors 
according to creditworthiness. 
I estimate Equation (1) using the ordinary-least squares method. results are reported in 
Table VIII. I find evidence that German and Japan laws allow for lower amounts relatively to 
England law at the level 0.01% and 0.03%. The New York law provides mixed results. There 
seems to be no differences between England and New York laws. This contrasts with the 
survey of laws presented in Section 2. This could be interpreted in different manners. On the 
one hand, the two laws provide the same enforcement power under certain conditions despite 
probable longer periods of court procedures. On the other hand, involving New York courts 
gives the creditors higher chance of success of the seizure of the defaulter’s assets.  
Therefore, I find evidence that the governing law matters. The investigation however 
bears its limitation. I suspect it should be extended to take account for other factors such as 
asset seizure. For instance, the right-hand side of equation (1) may include other variables 
such as the sum of exports and imports  vis-à-vis  each of the governing  law country. 
Moreover, the renegotiation process of bonds is essential as well, and therefore it should be 
taken into account in a subsequent study. 
6  Concluding remarks 
The paper explored whether the enforcement of governing laws of sovereign bonds are 
credible threats and whether they vary among major laws. Indeed, an essential difference 
among governing laws is their respective repayment enforcement power and costs. If policy 
makers decide to standardize collective actions in contracts or laws, the former will 
nevertheless subsist with hazardous consequences on the new frameworks. To the extent of 
my knowledge, this paper is the first one that addresses the heterogeneity of creditors rights   17 
protections in sovereign bonds. My findings yield important implications for the future 
reforms. 
I find that the governing law is a credible enforcement device. The analysis is based on 
the selection process of the governing law. I find the jurisdiction is determined by a set of 
factors that will imply effectiveness of the enforcement of the sovereign defaulter. The second 
result is that sovereign liabilities are larger when governed by the UK and US law. The main 
implication of these findings is that there actually exists a legal threat that looks credible. In 
line with Rose (2002), this provides additional evidence to Bulow and Rogoff (1989) that 
predicts the existence of a “stick” to explain the presence of sovereign debts contracted from 
private creditors. 
Therefore, if collective action clauses were widely implemented, I suspect no unbalanced 
bargaining powers among creditors due to varying governing laws enforcement powers. I 
therefore believe that the CAC should be promptly implemented as a major step toward the 
fully efficient international sovereign capital markets. 
The study should be regarded as the first analysis of the governing laws of sovereign 
tradable borrowings that draws new avenues of research. One valuable extension is the 
analysis of the determinants of the portfolio of governing laws the sovereign debtor holds at 
every year’s end. The jurisdiction shopping is likely to respond to macroeconomic indicators 
of creditworthiness, which should be interesting to investigate further. I believe having only 
one governing law  versus diversifying the portfolio of governing laws is also a strategic 
choice of the sovereign debtors. Moreover, UK and US laws vary in the way repayment terms 
are modifiable ( e.g.  voting majority  versus unanimity). The impact of such a settlement 
difference deserves further analysis as well, e.g. combining the analysis of  the volumes of 
issues with returns.   18 
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Table I 
Adoption of the Restrictive Doctrine of Foreign State Immunity 
Although sovereign immunity remains the general rule, a certain degree of restriction on immunity has been implemented in various jurisdictions. This table suggests 
a review of the deimmunisation and the adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. Distinction of legal origin follows La Porta et al. (1998). Rule of law 
is the assessment by investors of law enforcement (average over the period 1982-1995); scale from zero to 10; source: La Porta et al. (1997). Main source: Delaume 
(1994) and Wood (1995). 
Country  Rule of Law  Act / Case law 
English origin     
Australia  10.00  Foreign Sovereign Immunity Act, 1985 
Canada  10.00  Canadian State Immunity Act, 1982 
Pakistan  3.03  Pakistan State Immunities Ordinance, 1981 
Singapore  8.57  Singapore State Immunity Act, 1979 
South Africa  4.42  South-Africa Foreign State Immunity Act, 1981 
United Kingdom  8.57  State Immunity Act, 1978 
United States  10.00  Foreign State Immunity Act, 1976 
French origin     
Belgium  10.00  Since 1879: building contracts and trade. 
Mahieu, Brasseur v. République Hellénique, Judgement of May 24, 1933, Cass. 
France  8.98  Despite recent changes, historically narrow view of the restrictive doctrine. Execution is by no means clear. 
Société Transhipping v Federation of Pakistan, 47 ILR (1966) 150 
Administration des Chemins de Fer du Gouvernement Iranien v Société Levant Express Transport, 52 ILR (1969) 
315 (immunity held: acte de puissance publique) 
Spanish State v SA L’Hôtel George V, 65 ILR (1984) 61 
45 ILR 74, Turkey deimmunised on a bank loan guarantee 
Greece  6.18  Athenian Court of Appeal, Annual Digest 6 (1949) 291 
Italy  8.33  US v Irsa, 65 ILR (1963) 262 
Consorzio Agrario di Tripolitania Case, 65 ILR (1966) 265 
Netherlands  10.00  Société Européenne d’Études v Yugoslavia, 65 ILR (1973) 356 
Parsons v Malta, 65 ILR (1977) 371   21 
 
Table I (continued) 
Adoption of the Restrictive Doctrine of Foreign State Immunity 
Although sovereign immunity remains the general rule, a certain degree of restriction on immunity has been implemented in various jurisdictions. This table suggests 
a review of the deimmunisation and the adoption of the restrictive view of sovereign immunity. Distinction of legal origin follows La Porta et al. (1998). Rule of law 
is the assessment by investors of law enforcement (average over the period 1982-1995); scale from zero to 10; source: La Porta et al. (1997). Main source: Delaume 
(1994) and Wood (1995). 
Country  Rule of Law  Act / Case law 
German origin     
Austria  10.00  Dralle v Republic of Czechoslovakia 17 ILR (1950) 155 
Germany  9.23  Article 25, Basic Law of the Federal Republic of Germany 
“The general rules of international law shall form part of federal law. They shall take precedence over the laws and 
create rights duties directly for the inhabitants of the federal territory.” 
Claim v Empire of Iran, 45 ILR (1963) 57 
Munich court, 1977 ELD 23 
Central Bank of Nigeria Case, 65 ILR (1975) 131 
NIOC Pipelines Contracts Case, 65 ILR (1982) 212 
Switzerland  10.00  Very restrictive view of immunity related to loan transactions since the Dreyfus case, 1918. The Swiss courts require 
however substantial connection (Binnenbeziehung) between the claim and the exercise of the Swiss jurisdiction (for 
example, where payment is required by the contract to be made in Switzerland). Jurisdiction is otherwise declined. 
Austrian Minister of Finance v. Dreyfus, 44 ATF I 49 (1918). 
République Hellénique v. Walder, Judgement of Mar. 18, 1930, Trib. fed., ATF 65 I 237 
Royaume de Grèce v. Bank Julius Bär & et Cie., Judgement of Mar. 18, 1930, Trib. fed., ATF 65 I 237 
Scandinavian origin     
Denmark  10.00  Czechoslovakia v Jens Bygge Enterprises A/S, Supreme Ct, 1982, IIIJPI(1984) 639. Embassy construction. 
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Table II 
Currency Denomination, Listing Markets, and the Governing Law of Sovereign Eurobonds 
The table lists national laws that govern one or more emerging markets sovereign eurobonds in the period, January 1987 to December 1997, and their associated 
currency and listing markets. First column reports the governing law. Second column reports the rule of law, namely the assessment by investors of law enforcement 
(average over the period 1982-1995); scale from zero to 10; source: La Porta et al. (1997). The third column reports the number of contracts governed by the respective 
laws. The fourth column reports the number of loans that are listed in the same country as the governing law. Column five reports the number of private placements. 
Column six reports the number of loans designed with the same country of currency as the governing law. Seventh column reports the number of contracts that either 
are listed in the same country or have the same currency as the governing law. Eighth column reports the number of contracts that report no listing markets. Last 
column reports the total amounts of debts governed by each law in millions of constant 1995 US dollars. Note that the securities may be traded in several markets. In 
addition, private placements are never listed so that listing and private placements are two exclusive features. 
Governing Law  Rule  
of Law 
Number of 
contracts 
One listed market 
= governing law 
Private 
placements 
Currency 
= Governing law 
One listing market or 
currency = Governing law 
Unknown 
Listing 
Volumes in 
million 1995 USD 
Austria  10.00  2  2  0  2  2  0  165 
England  8.57  117  11  19  6  14  0  30,646 
Germany  9.23  66  65  0  66  66  1  22,187 
Japan  8.98  49  29  19  49  49  1  13,089 
Luxembourg  n.a.  1  1  0  0  1  0  472 
New York  10.00  85  8  15  72  72  3  47,877 
Spain  7.80  2  2  0  2  2  0  159 
Switzerland   10.00  5  4  1  5  5  0  513 
Unknown  -  2  .  1  .  .  1  314 
Total    329  130  55  202  211  6  115,517 
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Table III 
The Selection between England and New York Law by Issuing Country 
The table lists sovereign states that issued Eurobonds in the period, January 1987 to December 1997. The sample is constituted of 327 observations. For each 
country, I report the number and total amounts (in millions of 1995 USD) of eurobonds issued under the English and New York laws as well as their shares. 
Country  Observations  England  %  New York  %  Amounts  England  %  New York  % 
Argentina  81  47  58.0  10  12.3  30,679  12,841  41.9  9,208  30.0 
Barbados  4  3  75.0  0  0.0  130  100  76.4  0  0.0 
Bulgaria  2  2  100.0  0  0.0  104  104  100.0  0  0.0 
China  15  2  13.3  7  46.7  4,874  557  11.4  2,909  59.7 
Colombia  16  1  6.3  11  68.8  3,497  188  5.4  2,693  77.0 
Ecuador  2  0  0.0  2  100.0  520  0  0.0  520  100.0 
Guatemala  1  0  0.0  1  100.0  156  0  0.0  156  100.0 
Indonesia  1  0  0.0  1  100.0  408  0  0.0  408  100.0 
Jamaica  1  0  0.0  1  100.0  208  0  0.0  208  100.0 
Kazakhstan  2  1  50.0  1  50.0  573  206  40.0  368  64.2 
Lebanon  5  3  60.0  1  20.0  1,361  787  57.8  420  30.9 
Lithuania  3  3  100.0  0  0.0  320  320  100.0  0  0.0 
Malaysia  8  2  25.0  0  0.0  908  331  36.5  0  0.0 
Mexico  38  5  13.2  19  50.0  28,493  1,472  5.2  19,237  67.5 
Moldova  2  2  100.0  0  0.0  109  109  100.0  0  0.0 
Oman  1  1  100.0  0  0.0  234  234  100.0  0  0.0 
Pakistan  3  3  100.0  0  0.0  612  612  100.0  0  0.0 
Panama  2  1  50.0  1  50.0  1,255  735  58.6  520  41.4 
Philippines  4  2  50.0  0  0.0  1,227  850  69.3  0  0.0 
Poland  4  1  25.0  2  50.0  831  247  29.8  416  50.1 
Romania  1  0  0.0  0  0.0  362  0  0.0  0  0.0 
Russia  4  3  75.0  0  0.0  4,748  3,530  74.4  0  0.0 
Slovenia  2  1  50.0  0  0.0  578  331  57.3  0  0.0 
South Africa  10  3  30.0  3  30.0  4,021  481  11.9  2,285  56.8 
Sri Lanka  1  1  100.0  0  0.0  52  52  100.0  0  0.0 
Thailand  15  0  0.0  2  13.3  2,460  0  0.0  894  36.3 
Trinidad & Tobago  7  2  28.6  2  28.6  650  212  32.6  300  46.2 
Tunisia  2  0  0.0  2  100.0  153  0  0.0  153  100.0 
Turkey  59  21  35.6  7  11.9  16,738  5,495  32.8  1,342  8.0 
Ukraine  1  0  0.0  0  0.0  473  0  0.0  0  0.0 
Uruguay  8  0  0.0  5  62.5  1,019  0  0.0  696  68.3 
Venezuela  22  7  31.8  7  31.8  7,355  851  11.6  5,144  69.9 
Total  327  117  35.8  85  26.0  115,108  30,645  26.6  47,877  41.6   24 
 
 
 
Table IV 
Combined Analysis of the Currency of Denomination 
and the Listing Markets by Governing Law 
The table lists national laws that govern non-private placement bonds issued between January 1987 and December 
1997. Sovereign bonds are grouped by their currency of denomination (whether it is of the currency of the governing 
law state or not) and the listing markets (whether one of the listing markets at least is in the governing law 
jurisdiction). Private placements are excluded. The last column reports the number of bonds that are not listed in the 
governing law jurisdiction but are in Luxembourg. 322 bonds are reported in total. The difference with Table V is 
due to the absence of private placements and that five listing markets are not reported. 
Governing Law  Currency  Listed in the state of the 
governing law  
Listed in another 
state 
Of which listed in 
Luxembourg 
Austria  Austrian Shilling  1  1  1 
  Other currency  0  0  0 
England  English Pound  3  3  3 
  Other currency  8  84  80 
Germany  German Mark  65  0  0 
  Other currency  0  0  0 
Japan  Japanese Yen  29  0  0 
  Other currency  0  0  0 
Luxembourg  Luxemburg Franc  0  0  0 
  Other currency  1  0  1 
New York  US Dollar  7  52  50 
  Other currency  0  8  6 
Spain  Spanish Peseta  2  0  0 
  Other currency  0  0  0 
Switzerland  Swiss Franc  4  0  0 
  Other currency  0  0  0 
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Table V 
The Selection of the Governing Law in function of the 
Issuer Characteristics. 
The table reports the selection of the governing law of sovereign eurobonds in the period, January 1987 to December 
1997. Lines include the individual loan amount normalized to issuer’s GNP, the country total debt to GNP, and the 
yearly amounts raised from capital markets relative to GNP. Only main governing laws are reported in columns, 
namely England, Germany, New York, and Japan. 
  England  Germany  Japan  New York  All sample 
Individual bond amount to 
GNP (%) 
0.57  0.24  0.24  0.85  0.52 
Total debt to GNP (%)  39.0  40.9  38.0  43.8  40.1 
Yearly amount to GNP (%)  1.20  0.43  0.49  1.48  0.91 
 
 
 
 
 
Table VI 
Regression estimates 
The table reports the impact of the governing law on the funds available yearly relative to GNP in the period, January 
1987 to December 1997. The dependent variable is the sum of primary issues of bonds for a given country relative to 
GNP (in percentage). The country dummies, Germany, Japan, and New York, are dummy variables that take 1 if the 
group of bonds is governed respectively by Germany, Japan and New York laws, 0 otherwise. England law is the 
omitted dummy variable and therefore is the benchmark. Debt to GNP is the indicator of creditworthiness of the 
issuing country. 
  Germany  Japan  New York  Debt to GNP  Constant 
Yearly amount to GNP (%)  -0.86  -0.71  0.02  2.16  0.41 
  0.00  0.03  0.92  0.00  0.16 
R
2=0.144        Number of obs. = 181         Prob > F= 0.0         F(4, 176) = 7.38 
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